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Abstract
We examine the investor sentiment and limits-to-arbitrage explanations for the positive
cross-sectional relation between cash holdings and future stock returns. Consistent with
the investor sentiment hypothesis, we find that the cash holding effect is significant when
sentiment is low, and it is insignificant when sentiment is high. In addition, the cash
holding effect is strong among stocks with high transaction costs, high short selling costs,
and large idiosyncratic volatility, indicating that arbitrage on the cash holding effect is
costly and risky. In line with the limits-to-arbitrage hypothesis, high costs and risk
prevent rational investors from exploiting the cash holding effect.
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1 Introduction
Asset pricing theories suggest that higher returns should be compensation for higher system-
atic risk. However, a number of studies provide empirical evidence on anomalies that cannot
be explained by the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) of Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965),
and the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model.1 In particular, recent studies by Palazzo
(2012) and Simutin (2010) document a cash holding effect that firms with high cash-to-assets
ratios or excess cash outperform firms with low cash ratios or excess cash significantly, even
after adjusting for the Fama and French’s (1993) three factors. They attribute the strong
stock return performance of firms with high cash holdings to risk caused by a high correlation
between cash flows and the aggregate shock, or risk of firms’ growth options.
In this study, we examine the investor sentiment and limits-to-arbitrage explanations for
the cash holding effect. Our motivation follows Baker and Wurgler (2006), who suggest that
both investor sentiment and limited arbitrage can lead to market mispricing because investor
sentiment as the propensity to speculate can drive the demand for speculation. Baker and
Wurgler (2006) show that stock returns of certain firms, such as firms with small size, negative
operating profits, non-dividend paying, financial distress, or extreme growth potential, are
highly affected by investor sentiment. These characteristics tend to coincide with those of
1See, for example, price momentum (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993), value premium (Fama and French, 1992 and
Lakonishock et al., 1994), accruals (Sloan, 1996), net operating asset (Hirshleifer et al., 2004), idiosyncratic volatility
(Ang et al., 2006 and 2009), investment-to-assets (Titman et al., 2004 and Xing, 2008), financial distress (Campbell et
al., 2008), asset growth (Cooper et al., 2008), and profitability (Novy-Marx, 2013 and Ball et al., 2015.)
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high cash firms.2 Therefore, market mispricing is likely to happen in firms with high or low
cash holdings.
In addition, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) develop a limits-to-arbitrage argument to un-
derstand anomalies. They argue that anomalies cannot be removed immediately because
transaction costs and idiosyncratic volatility impose barriers against arbitrage (Pontiff, 1996
and 2006). The literature has shown strong supports for this argument to explain different
anomalies. For example, Ali et al. (2003) find that the book-to-market effect is concen-
trated in firms with high transaction costs and large idiosyncratic volatility. Mashruwala et
al. (2006) and Hirshleifer et al. (2011) show that great idiosyncratic volatility, high trans-
action costs, and short-sale constraints prevent rational traders from exploiting the accrual
anomaly. Li and Zhang (2010), Lam and Wei (2011), and Lipson et al. (2012) highlight the
limits-to-arbitrage explanation for the asset growth anomaly. McLean (2010) reports that
the long-term reversal anomaly is related to limits-to-arbitrage. Brav et al. (2010) demon-
strate that limits-to-arbitrage plays an important role in explaining overvaluation anomalies.
McLean and Pontiff (2016) study 97 anomalies and find that mispricing accounts for the pre-
dictability of characteristics on the cross-sectional stock returns. Surprisingly, little empirical
research has addressed the investor sentiment and limits-to-arbitrage explanations on the cash
holding effect. This paper intends to fill this gap.
We hypothesize that irrational investors may make systematic errors when they value
firms with different levels of cash holding. They are pessimistic about the future earnings, the
degree of information asymmetry, and agency costs of high cash firms and optimistic about
2See, for example, Kim et al. (1998), Opler et al. (1999), Bates et al. (2009), Simutin (2010) and Palazzo (2012).
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these of low cash firms. As a result, irrational investors may undervalue firms with high cash
holdings and overvalue firms with low cash holdings. Rational investors recognize trading firms
with different levels of cash holding as an arbitrage opportunity. However, high transaction
costs, high short-selling costs, and large idiosyncratic volatility prevent rational investors
from exploiting the profit opportunity of cash holding trading strategy and eliminating the
mispricing quickly. We, therefore, examine two important questions: (1) Are stock returns of
firms with different levels of cash holding highly influenced by investor sentiment? (2) Is the
cash holding effect associated with high transaction costs, high short-selling costs, and large
idiosyncratic volatility?
We use two cash holding measures of cash-to-assets ratio (Palazzo, 2012) and excess cash
(Simutin, 2010), and two investor sentiment measures of the Baker and Wurgler investor
sentiment index and the University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index. Following a
number of existing studies,3 our limits-to-arbitrage proxies include transaction costs, short
selling costs and idiosyncratic volatility.
Consistent with Palazzo (2012) and Simutin (2010), we find that high cash firms out-
perform low cash firms in stock returns significantly, regardless of the cash holding measures.
More importantly, the stock returns of cash holding portfolios are highly influenced by investor
sentiment. When sentiment is low, the returns of cash holding portfolios are larger than those
3See, for example, Mitchell and Pulvino (2001) use direct and indirect trading costs to capture transaction costs for
limit-to-arbitrage. Ali et al. (2003) show that the book-to-market effect is larger for stocks with higher transaction costs
measures of bid-ask spread, brokerage commissions, dollar trading volume, and costs of short selling. Mashruwala et al.
(2006) report that the accrual anomaly is stronger for stocks with lower trading volume. Li and Zhang (2010) and Lam
and Wei (2010) also examine the limits-to-arbitrage hypothesis in explaining asset growth anomaly through transaction
costs measures, including bid-ask spread, institutional ownership, price impact, and dollar trading volume. Mitchell et
al. (2002) and Doukas et al. (2010) find that costs of short-selling are particularly high and deter arbitrageurs from
exploring arbitrage opportunities.
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when sentiment is high across both the cash holding measures and the two sentiment indices.
With only one exception, the cash holding effect is significant when sentiment is low, and it is
insignificant when sentiment is high. This is in line with the investor sentiment explanation.
Using a two-way independent sorts approach, based on the limits-to-arbitrage proxies and
the cash holding measures, we find that the cash holding effect is stronger for stocks with
higher transaction costs, higher short selling costs, and larger idiosyncratic volatility. Using
Fama and MacBeth’s (1973) cross-sectional regressions, our results show that the coefficients of
the cash holding variable are significantly larger in magnitude in firms with high transaction
and short selling costs, and great idiosyncratic volatility than in firms with low costs and
idiosyncratic volatility. The results suggest that arbitrage on the cash holding effect is costly
and risky.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the investor sentiment
and limits-to-arbitrage hypotheses for the cash holding effect. Section 3 describes data used
in this study, the measures of cash holding, and the proxies for investor sentiment and limits-
to-arbitrage. Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Hypothesis Development
Firms with high cash holdings are likely to have poor past operating performance. Investors
may make systematic errors in expectations about future prices of those stocks because their
valuations are highly subjective. High transaction costs, high short selling costs, and large
idiosyncratic volatility make arbitrage on the cash holding effect costly and risky. In this
section, we develop our hypotheses of investor sentiment and limits-to-arbitrage on firms with
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different levels of cash holding based on Baker and Wurgler (2006) and Shleifer and Vishny
(1997).
2.1 Investor Sentiment
Investors are not fully rational. They may trade securities according to their beliefs based
on past earnings and investment risks. As a result, markets are highly influenced by investor
sentiment (Barberis et al., 1998 and Baker and Wurgler, 2007). Baker and Wurgler (2006)
find that investors mark stocks with low past earnings and non-dividend paying as speculative
stocks, while they mark stocks with high profitability and stable dividends as safe stocks.
They have low propensity to speculate for safe stocks and high propensity to speculate for
speculative stocks. Bates et al. (2009), Simutin (2010) and Palazzo (2012) show that firms
with high cash holdings are likely to be speculative stocks, while firms with low cash holdings
tend to be safe stocks according to their characteristics. Hence, returns of stocks with high
and low cash holdings might be highly sensitive to speculative demand.
Moreover, Opler et al. (1999) argue that firms increasing cash holdings might result
from their high degrees of information asymmetry. Faulkender and Wang (2006) and Denis
and Sibilkov (2010) prove that financially constrained firms have high levels of information
asymmetry and are likely to save larger amounts of cash. Jensen (1986) proposes that the
agency problem is particularly severe for a firm with large free cash flow. Dittmar et al. (2003)
show that firms in countries with greater agency problems tend to hold more cash. Harford
(1999), Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007), Harford et al. (2008) and Nikolov and Whited
(2014) also find that firms with high cash holdings have high agency costs on acquisition.
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Therefore, investors may overreact to bad news of firms with high cash holdings and underreact
to good news of firms with low cash holdings because of their pessimism and optimism about
future earnings, information asymmetry, and agency costs of firms with different levels of cash
holding. We therefore hypothesize that stock returns of firms with high and low cash holdings
might be heavily affected by investor sentiment.
2.2 The Limits of Arbitrage
Sharpe and Alexander (1990) define arbitrage as exploring price differences on the same or
similar securities by buying underpriced stocks and shorting substitutes or overpriced stocks
simultaneously. In this section, we discuss the impact of transaction costs, short selling costs,
and idiosyncratic volatility on arbitrage activities.
2.2.1 Transaction costs and arbitrage
Investors incur transaction costs, such as brokerage fees, commissions, and market impact
when they buy or sell securities. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Pontiff (1996, 2006) show
that transaction costs create the bounds that limit the ability of rational investors to eliminate
market mispricing. Many studies use transaction costs as proxies for limits-to-arbitrage. For
example, Ali et al. (2003) examine limits-to-arbitrage on the book-to-market anomaly using
three types of transaction costs: direct, indirect, and costs related to short selling. Mashruwala
et al. (2006) use stock price and trading volume to capture transaction costs.
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2.2.2 Short selling costs
Ali et al. (2003) argue that short-sale has an impact on costs of arbitrage. To sell short, a
rational investor has to borrow a stock from the owner of the stock and leave collateral for
the borrowing. Dechow et al. (2001) point out that short sellers suffer from short squeeze risk
because they must repurchase the borrowed stock if the original lender requires the borrowing
position to be closed. Stocks with high institutional ownership have low short squeeze risk
and low short selling costs because it is easy to find alternative lenders who own the stocks.
Nagel (2005) also argues that low institutional ownership leads to a shortage of supply for
stocks that can be borrowed and results in high short selling costs.
2.2.3 Idiosyncratic volatility and arbitrage
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) emphasize that arbitrage resources are mainly available to a few
specialized traders. They are poorly diversified and more concerned with idiosyncratic volatil-
ity than systematic volatility because the former cannot be hedged. As stocks are not ratio-
nally priced, high idiosyncratic volatility makes arbitrage less attractive, particularly for some
volatile and overpriced stocks. Therefore, idiosyncratic volatility prevents rational investors
from exploiting the mispricing.
Pontiff (2006) argues that, apart from transaction costs, holding costs also make arbitrage
more expensive. He identifies idiosyncratic volatility as a part of holding cost of arbitrage,
which has an impact on both mispricing and the selling decision of rational investors. Im-
plementing an arbitrage strategy involves simultaneously buying the underpriced stocks and
shorting the overpriced stocks. Hence, the returns on the arbitrage portfolio do not comove
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with the market returns, and arbitrage strategy is only subject to idiosyncratic volatility. For
a mean-variance investor, the optimal portfolio weights are negatively related to idiosyncratic
volatility. Rational investors would hold fewer positions in stocks with high idiosyncratic
volatility and result in less selling pressure for these stocks. Therefore, firms with high id-
iosyncratic volatility have high holding costs.
3 Data and the Measures
We use common stocks listed on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ from the period of July
1972 to June 2011.4 We exclude heavily regulated utility firms (SIC codes between 4900
and 4999) and financial firms (SIC codes between 6000 and 6999). Monthly and daily stock
returns, stock prices, the number of shares outstanding and trading volume are collected from
the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). Accounting data are obtained from the
Compustat database. Quarterly institutional stock holdings are from the Thomson Financial
Institutional Holdings (13F) database. We exclude stocks with a negative book-to-market
ratio or a negative cash-to-assets ratio. For delisted stocks, we use the CRSP delisting returns
if they are available; otherwise, we follow Shumway (1997) to adjust missing delisting returns
if the delisting is performance-related. The daily and monthly return series of the Fama and
French (1993) three factors, including size, book-to-market, and market excess returns, and
risk-free rates are from Kenneth French’s website.5 We collect two sentiment indices: the
4The beginning period of our sample is consistent with Palazzo (2012). We identify common stocks as those with
CRSP share code 10 and 11.
5http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/.
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Baker and Wurgler (2006) investor sentiment index from Jeffrey Wurgler’s website and the
University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.6
3.1 Cash Holding Measures
Our first cash holding measure is the monthly cash-to-assets ratio. Following Palazzo (2012),
this is calculated as cash and marketable securities (data item CHEQ) over total assets (data
item ATQ) using the accounting data from the latest quarter.7 The second cash holding
measure is the excess cash defined as the residual from the following cross-sectional regression
of the log of cash-to-assets ratios against the determinate variables highlighted by Opler et al.
(1999):
Ci,t =γ0,t + γ1,tMBi,t + γ2,tSizei,t + γ3,tCPXi,t + γ4,tWCi,t + γ5,tLTDi,t + γ6,tR&Di,t
+ γ7,tCFi,t + γ8,tσ
IND
i,t + γ9,tINDdummyi,t + γ10,tDivdummyi,t + εi,t,
(1)
where C is the log of cash-to-assets ratio, measured as cash (data item CHE) divided by total
assets (data item AT ) less cash; MB is the market-to-book ratio calculated as the book value
of assets, minus the book value of equity (data item CEQ), plus the market value of equity,
divided by the book value of assets; Size is the log of total assets that have been adjusted
for inflation; CPX is the ratio of capital expenditures (data item CAPX) over total assets;
WC is the ratio of net working capital over total assets. We calculate net working capital by
subtracting cash from working capital (data item WCAP ). LTD is the ratio of long-term
debt (data item DLTT ) over total assets; R&D is the ratio of research and development
6http://people.stern.nyu.edu/jwurgler/. and http://research.stlouisfed.org/.
7For instance, to estimate the cash-to-assets ratios of month-1, 2, or 3 in year t for a stock, we use the 4th quarter
data in year t− 1. Again, to estimate the ratios of month-4, 5, or 6 in year t, we use the 1st quarter data in year t.
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expense (R&D) (data item XRD) over sales (data item SALE); CF is the ratio of cash flow
over total assets. We estimate cash flow as operating income after interest, dividends, and
taxes, but before depreciation (data item OIBDP − DV C − TXT − XINT ). σIND is the
industry sigma calculated as the mean of standard deviations of CF over 10 years for firms in
the same two-digit SIC industry. Following Simutin (2010), we also include industry dummies
(INDdummy) based on Kenneth French’s 17 industry definitions and a dividend dummy
(Divdummy). The residual, εi,t, from Equation (1) is the excess cash measure (ECM) for
stock i in year t.
3.2 Transaction Costs Measures
Following Ali et al. (2003), we employ three transaction costs measures: the quoted bid-ask
spread of Amihud and Mendelson (1986), the price impact of Amihud (2002), and dollar
trading volume. They are calculated as the average daily measure over the prior 12 months.
The quoted bid-ask spread (BA) is estimated as the difference between the quoted ask price
and bid price to the mid-quote on a particular day.8 It represents compensation to the market
maker or dealer for a round-trip transaction (purchase and sale). Stocks with high BA are
more costly than stocks with low BA. Price impact (PI) is defined as the daily absolute
return-to-dollar-volume ratio. It captures the reaction of transaction price to trading volume.
Stocks with high PI are more expensive to trade than stocks with low PI. Dollar trading
8For NYSE/Amex stocks, the CRSP daily bid and ask prices are closing bid and closing ask prices, whereas
NASDAQ uses the inside quotation as the bid and ask prices. When the bid or ask prices of a stock are not available on
a day, we use Bid or Low price, or Ask or High price from the CRSP as the bid and ask prices for the stock, respectively.
We also calculate bid-ask spread using data from the Trade and Quote (TAQ) Database, which are obtained from:
http://www.vanderbiltfmrc.org/databases/market-microstructure-database/. As our results show that the TAQ BAs
are highly correlated with the CRSP BAs, we do not report these results here.
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volume (DV ) is calculated as the number of shares traded multiplied by the transaction price
during a day. Trades are more likely to be completed quickly and lead to less adverse price
impact if stocks are heavily traded. Therefore, stocks with high DV are cheaper to trade than
stocks with low DV .
We also use the percentage of institutional ownership (IO) divided by the number of
shares outstanding using the data from the latest quarter to capture the costs of short selling.
Dechow et al. (2001) argue that institutional ownership indicates stock supply to borrow
in the equity loan market. Low institutional ownership implies a limited source available to
borrow for a stock and high potential squeeze risk. Therefore, stocks with a low percentage
of institutional ownership have large short selling costs.
3.3 Idiosyncratic Volatility
A number of studies employ the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model (hereafter FF3)
to estimate idiosyncratic volatility (e.g., Xu and Malkiel, 2003; Bali et al., 2005; Bali and
Cakici, 2008; Ang et al., 2006 and 2009; Fu, 2009; and Huang et al., 2010). Following these
studies, we measure the idiosyncratic volatility of each stock from the following Fama and
French (1993) three-factor model:
Ri,τ −Rf,τ = αi + βi,MKT (Rm,τ −Rf,τ ) + siSMBτ + hiHMLτ + εi,τ (2)
where Ri,τ is the return on stock i at the end of day τ . Rf,τ is the one-month Treasury bill rate
and Rm,τ is the value-weighted market return on all stocks listed on the NYSE, AMEX, and
NASDAQ. SMBτ (Small-Minus-Big) and HMLτ (High-Minus-Low) are the returns on the
mimicking portfolios for capturing the size and book-to-market equity effects. εi,τ represents
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the idiosyncratic return on stock i. We use the daily excess returns in equation (2). The
idiosyncratic volatility of a stock, denoted IV OLFF3, is calculated as the standard deviations
of residuals from the FF3 regression over the prior 12 months with a minimum of 100 days,
respectively.
Table I provides summary statistics and the correlation coefficients across the measures of
cash holding, transaction costs, short selling costs, and idiosyncratic volatility. The cash-to-
assets measure (CH) is significantly correlated with the excess cash measure (ECM), with a
correlation coefficient of 0.530. Moreover, CH and ECM are negatively correlated with the
transaction costs measures of the bid-ask spread (BA) and price impact (PI), and positively
correlated with dollar volume (DV ). This suggests that low cash firms might have high trans-
action costs and low trading volume. Interestingly, we find the different correlations between
CH and ECM with institutional ownership and idiosyncratic volatility. Specifically, there is
a negative (positive) correlation between CH (ECM) and institutional ownership (IO), while
a positive (negative) correlation between CH (ECM) and IV OLFF3. This indicates that in-
stitutional ownership and idiosyncratic volatility are sensitive to the determinate variables of
cash holding in Equation (1), which is in line with the finding of Nagal (2005) for the strong
positive correlation between stock institutional ownership and firm size.
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4 Empirical Results
4.1 Descriptive Analysis for Cash Holding Portfolios
We first investigate the return performance of cash holding portfolios. Following Palazzo
(2012), we form cash-to-assets (CH) portfolios on a monthly basis. Specifically, at the end
of each month of year t, we sort stocks based on their past month cash-to-assets ratio (CH)
and form ten deciles. We hold the portfolios for the subsequent month and rebalance them
every month during the sample period. To form ECM portfolios, we modify Simutin’s (2010)
approach by sorting stocks into groups annually rather than monthly. In particular, at the
end of June of year t, we sort stocks into ten ECM portfolios based on stocks excess cash
measured by using accounting data from year t− 1. The portfolios are held for the following
twelve months and rebalanced annually.
Table II reports the equal-weighted monthly average raw returns, the abnormal returns
from the CAPM (CAPM alpha) and the FF3 (FF3 alpha) for cash holding portfolios.9 We
calculate the t-statistics based on Newey and West (1987) standard errors with 6 lags through-
out the paper. Panels A and B present the results under the cash-to-assets (CH) and excess
cash measures (ECM), respectively. CH1 (ECM1) represents the bottom cash-to-assets (ex-
cess cash measure) decile and CH10 (ECM10) represents the top cash-to-assets (excess cash
measure) decile. ∆CH (∆ECM) represents a hedge portfolio that is long the top portfolio,
9The reported returns in this study are the equal-weighted returns. We also calculate the value-weighted returns
for CH portfolios. Consistent with Palazzo (2012), the FF3 alpha of CH10 is significantly larger than that of CH1.
For ECM portfolios, the value-weighted returns are misleading as they suffer from double counting problem for market
capitalizations. We therefore do not report the value-weighted returns here.
13
CH10 (ECM10), and shorts the bottom portfolio, CH1 (ECM1). Panel A of Table II shows
that the returns rise monotonically from portfolio CH1 to CH10. Moreover, CH10 outperform
CH1 significantly, with 0.567% (t=2.21) per month for the raw return, and 0.937% (t=4.82)
per month for the FF3 alpha. Consistent with Simutin (2010), Panel B of Table II suggests
that the top ECM portfolio generates the highest returns and the bottom ECM portfolio
yields the lowest returns across ECM deciles. In addition, the returns of the hedge portfolio,
∆ECM , are significant at the 5% level across the three return performance measures.
Panel A of Table III presents firm characteristics of CH deciles. The reported firm char-
acteristics are: excess cash measure (ECM), market capitalization of equity (MV , in millions
dollar), book-to-market ratio (B/M), cash flow risk (CFR), profitability (Profit), leverage
(Leverage), net investment (NetInv), dividend dummy (DivDummy), research and develop-
ment expense to sales ratio (R&D), and acquisitions to assets ratio (Acquisition). We define
a dividend dummy as one in years for a firm with dividend payout and zero otherwise. The
detailed definitions of firm characteristics are reported in Appendix. Clearly, the ECMs in-
crease monotonically from portfolio CH1 to portfolio CH10, suggesting that ECM portfolios
are likely to have similar firm characteristics with CH portfolios. Therefore, we only examine
them for CH portfolios.
Consistent with Opler et al. (1999), Bates et al. (2009) and Palazzo (2012), firms with the
highest cash holdings tend to be small and growth firms (low MV and B/M ratios). They
have high cash flow risk and generate negative income. Only 25.5% of firms in portfolio CH10
pay dividends. In addition, high cash firms have low spending on capital expenditure and high
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R&D ratio. Opler and Titman (1994) argue that firms with high R&D ratios are likely to
have large costs of financial distress due to their high sensitivity to customer-driven sale loss.
Almeida et al. (2004) and Bates et al. (2009) find that firms with negative income and paying
no dividends are likely to be financially constrained firms. Fazzari et al. (1988), Morellec
and Schu¨rhoff (2011), and Li and Luo (2014) demonstrate that financially constrained firms
have high degrees of information asymmetry. Our findings are in line with the hypothesis
of Opler et al. (1999) that firms with high cash holdings have high degrees of information
asymmetry because they are small distressed firms and have poor access to external funds.
Therefore, they borrow less debt to finance their investments and have extremely low leverage.
Conversely, firms with low cash holdings have low cash flow risk, produce positive profitability
and have low R&D ratios, indicating low financial distress costs for low cash firms. Hence,
they borrow more debt to take tax advantage. On average, 40.2% of firms in portfolio CH1
pay dividends to their shareholders.
Panel B of Table III reports the transaction costs and short selling costs measures, including
the bid-ask spread (BA), price impact (PI), dollar volume (DV ), and the percentage of
institutional ownership (IO) for CH portfolios. Portfolio CH10 has lower BA and PI than
portfolio CH1, indicating that firms with the highest cash holdings have lower transaction
costs than firms with the lowest cash holdings. This is consistent with the findings of Gopalan
et al. (2012) on the positive relation between asset liquidity and stock liquidity. Moreover,
portfolio CH10 has lower DV and IO than portfolio CH1, suggesting that high cash firms
have less trading volume and higher short selling costs than low cash firms.
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Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Ang et al. (2000) show that agency costs of a firm are
highly related to its ownership structure. Firms with more institutional ownership should
have low agency costs as large shareholders play monitoring roles for management (Shleifer
and Vishny, 1986). Our results on IO support the hypothesis that high cash firms have large
agency costs due to their low IO, while low cash firms tend to have low agency costs. Panel
C presents idiosyncratic volatilities for CH portfolios. The results indicate that firms with
high cash holdings have larger idiosyncratic risk than firms with low cash holdings.
4.2 Investor Sentiment for Cash Holding Portfolios
Baker and Wurgler (2006) argue that investor sentiment can lead to market mispricing and
has a significant impact on the cross-sectional stock returns, particularly for stocks with high
sensitivity to speculative demand. They develop the Baker and Wurgler sentiment index
from six sentiment proxies, including the closed-end fund discount, NYSE share turnover, the
number of initial public offerings, the average first day’s returns of initial public offerings, the
equity share in new issue, and the dividend premium. To examine the role of sentiment in
explaining the cash holding effect, we also use the University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment
Index which is a consumer confidence measure. Lemmon and Portnaguina (2006) show that
this measure can capture investor sentiment in stock mispricing.
Table IV displays the equal-weighted FF3 alphas for cash holding portfolios conditional on
sentiment. Panels A and B report the results on CH and ECM decile portfolios, respectively.
Following Baker and Wuger (2006), we first put each monthly return of portfolios together.
According to the level of sentiment at the end of the previous month, we calculate the average
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portfolio returns over the months in which sentiment is above and below the median based
on the Baker and Wuger (2006) investor sentiment index and the University of Michigan
Consumer Sentiment Index. We also compute the return difference between above and below
the median for each portfolio.
Our results show that both investor sentiment and consumer sentiment affect the returns on
cash holding portfolios significantly. Specifically, the returns on CH portfolios are higher when
the investor and consumer sentiment indices are below the median than when they are above
the median. For instance, the FF3 alphas range from a low of −0.233% to a high of 0.308%
when investor sentiment is above the median, while they range from −0.062% to 1.072% for
CH deciles when investor sentiment is below the median. The ECM portfolios have a similar
pattern of the returns to that of CH portfolios based on the two sentiment indices. More
importantly, the FF3 alphas of hedge portfolios (∆CH, ∆ECM) are statistically significant
at the 1% level when sentiment is below the median. Conversely, they are insignificant when
sentiment is above the median with only one exception (∆ECM based on the Baker and
Wuger (2006) investor sentiment index). It is interesting to note that the FF3 alphas of
ECM hedge portfolio (∆ECM) are similar between sentiment above and below the median.
The possible explanation might be that excess cash is measured after controlling for size,
book-to-market and other variables. Those variables have been found to be highly related to
investor sentiment (Baker and Wurgler, 2006).
In order to further investigate the impact of sentiment on the cash holding effect, we need
a more accurate measure of sentiment. Since sentiment cannot be directly observed, it must
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be estimated from other variables. The Baker and Wurgler (2006) investor sentiment index
as the most widely used sentiment measure is estimated as the first principal component from
six sentiment proxies. Da et al. (2015) and Huang et al. (2015) criticize that this measure
reflects the outcome of balancing economic components and is subject to substantial amount
of measurement errors. As a result, the Baker and Wurgler (2006) investor sentiment index
may fail to produce strong predictors for future stock returns. We therefore need to identify a
portfolio that is highly correlated with market-wide sentiment. Breeden et al. (1989) develop
a maximum correlation portfolio (MCP) approach that calculate the portfolio weights as
the proportions of the coefficients in a multiple regression and use the weights to construct
the maximum correlation portfolio. This approach can mitigate the downward bias in the
coefficient of determination of the regression. Because there is no portfolio whose return is
perfectly correlated with sentiment, we follow Jagannathan and Wang (2007) and run the
regression of the demeaned sentiment index on monthly excess returns of the 2 × 3 equal-
weighted MV&B/M -sorted portfolios to obtain portfolio weights. We then use the weights to
form the maximum correlation portfolio of sentiment in order to reduce forecasting errors.10
Our regression models are as follows:
RHigh−Low,t = a0 + a1SentimentMCP,t−1 + eit, (3)
RHigh−Low,t = a0 + a1SentimentMCP,t−1 + a2(Rm,t −Rf,t)t + a3SMBt + a4HMLt + eit, (4)
10A number of studies use the MCP approach. For instance, Breeden et al. (1989) adopt the MCP approach for
aggregate consumption growth. Jagannathan and Wang (2007) use the approach to examine the measurement errors
of consumption-based capital asset pricing model. Ferson and Harvey (1993) apply the similar method to measure
conditional beta and global risk premier.
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where RHigh−Low,t is the portfolio return that is long the top three CHs or ECMs deciles and
shorts the bottom three corresponding deciles in month t following Baker and Wurgler (2006).
SentimentMCP,t−1 is the returns on maximum correlation portfolio (MCP) of sentiment in
month t− 1.
Table V reports the estimates for CH and ECM hedge portfolios based on the two sen-
timent indices. The coefficients of SentimentMCP,t−1 are significantly negative before and
after controlling for the Fama and French (1993) three factors, with only one exception (the
marginal significant coefficient of ECM hedge portfolio from the model with the Fama and
French (1993) three factors based on the Baker and Wurgler investor sentiment index). The
results confirm that the cash holding effect is strong when both sentiment indices are low.
This indicates that sentiment is a significant predictor for the cash holding effect, which is
consistent with the argument of Baker and Wurgler (2006).
4.3 Transaction and Short Selling Costs for the Cash Holding Effect
In order to address the issue of whether the cash holding effect is concentrated in stocks
with high costs, we first use a two-way portfolio sorts approach and examine the variations of
the cash holding effect across transaction costs and institutional ownership portfolios. Then,
we run Fama-MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions to compare the slopes of the cash
holding variable for the transaction costs and institutional ownership subgroups.
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4.3.1 Portfolio sorts
We sort stocks on their cash holding measures intersected with independent sorts on the
transaction costs and short selling costs measures. Consistent with the approaches in Table
II, we form the CH-based portfolios on a monthly basis and the ECM -based portfolios on
an annual basis. Specifically, at the end of each month of year t, we sort stocks into five CH
portfolios based on their cash-to-assets ratio. Also, we sort stocks independently into three
transaction and short selling costs portfolios based on their bid-ask spread (BA), price impact
(PI), dollar volume (DV ) and percentage of institutional ownership (IO). The portfolios are
held for the subsequent month. For the ECM -based portfolios, at the end of June of each
year t, we sort stocks into five portfolios based on their excess cash measure and sort stocks
independently into three transaction and short selling costs portfolios. The portfolios are held
for the following twelve months and rebalanced annually. Table VI reports the equal-weighted
FF3 alphas for the two-way sorted portfolios. Panels A and B present the results for CH and
ECM portfolios, respectively. The subscript 1 stands for the bottom quintile or tercile and
the subscript 5 (3) stands for the top quintile (tercile). ∆ denotes a hedge portfolio that is
long the top portfolio and shorts the bottom portfolio.
We find that CH5s (ECM5s) uniformly outperform CH1s (ECM1s) after controlling for
the transaction costs and short selling costs measures. The cash holding effect increases
monotonically from low costs portfolios to high costs portfolios. Moreover, the abnormal
returns of hedge portfolio ∆CH (∆ECM) are higher for BA3, PI3, DV1 and IO1 portfolios
than those for BA1, PI1, DV3 and IO3 portfolios. For example, the FF3 alphas of ∆CH is
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1.628% (t=4.69) for BA3 and 0.651% (t=3.49) for BA1. That of ∆ECM is 0.902% (t=2.59)
for BA3 and 0.224% (t=1.9) for BA1. Overall, our results suggest that the cash holding effect
is more pronounced for stocks with high costs than stocks with low costs.
4.3.2 Cross-sectional regression
We next run the following Fama-MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions for the low and
high subgroups by splitting the full sample into terciles according to the transaction costs and
short selling costs measures:
Ri,t+1 −Rf, t+1 = γ0 + γ1CHi,t + γ2ln(MV )i,t + γ3ln(B/M)i,t + γ4MOMi,t + εi,t+1, (5)
where Ri,t+1 is the monthly raw returns from July of year t to June of year t+ 1, Rf, t+1 is the
risk-free rate, CH is the cash holding variable, ln(MV ) is the natural logarithm of market
capitalization calculated with information available at the end of June of year t, ln(B/M) is
the natural logarithm of the ratio of the book value of equity for the fiscal year ending in year
t− 1 divided by market equity at the end of December of year t− 1, MOM is the cumulative
compounded stock returns of the previous 6 months from June of year t to May of year t+ 1.
Table VII presents the average slopes from Fama and MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional
regressions for each subgroup. Low and High denote the subgroups that comprise stocks
in the bottom and the top terciles of BA, PI, DV and IO, respectively. High-Low is the
difference between the top and the bottom terciles. After controlling for the size, book-to-
market and momentum variables, the cash holding variable has strong explanatory power for
the High BA and PI, and Low DV and IO subgroups for both of the cash holding measures.
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Moreover, the slopes of CH and ECM are significantly greater in magnitude for the High BA
and PI, and Low IO subgroups than those in the Low BA and PI, and High IO subgroups.
For example, the slope of cash holding variable is 4.084 (t=2.65) under the CH measure
and 0.118 (t=2.36) under the ECM measure for the High-Low BA subgroup. These results
confirm the finding in Table VI that the profitability of cash holding trading strategy is costly.
4.4 Idiosyncratic Volatility for the Cash Holding Effect
In this section, we use both the two-way portfolio sorts approach and Fama-MacBeth (1973)
cross-sectional regressions to investigate whether the cash holding effect is strong for stocks
with large idiosyncratic volatility.
4.4.1 Portfolio sorts
Similar to the formation of the two-way sorts on cash holding and transaction costs, we
sort stocks based on their cash holding and idiosyncratic volatility independently. Panels
A and B of Table VIII report the equal-weighted FF3 alphas for CH and ECM portfolios,
respectively. The cash holding effect is stronger in high idiosyncratic volatility portfolios than
in low idiosyncratic volatility portfolios regardless of the cash holding measures. For instance,
the FF alpha is 1.404% (t=5.77) per month for ∆CH and 0.837% (t=2.9) per month for
∆ECM for high IV OL portfolio (IV OL3); while the FF alpha is 0.456% (t=4.16) per month
for ∆CH and 0.177% (t=2.88) per month for ∆ECM for low IV OL portfolio (IV OL1). The
results indicate that stocks with high idiosyncratic volatility produce the stronger cash holding
effect than stocks with low idiosyncratic volatility.
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4.4.2 Cross-sectional regression
We also run the monthly excess returns in equation (5) by splitting the full sample into
three terciles based on stocks’ idiosyncratic volatility. Table IX reports the average slopes
for the Low, High and High-Low idiosyncratic volatility subgroups. It can be observed that
the regressions estimate the strong positive average slopes of CH and ECM for both of the
Low and High idiosyncratic volatility subgroups. In particular, the slopes of CH and ECM
variables are significantly larger in magnitude in the high idiosyncratic volatility subgroup than
in the low idiosyncratic volatility subgroup. For instance, the slope of CH is 2.196 (t=5.28)
and that of ECM is 0.16 (t=4.46) for the High-Low idiosyncratic volatility subgroup. This
is in line with the limits-to-arbitrage hypothesis that arbitrage on the cash holding effect is
risky.
4.5 Cross-sectional Regression over the Full Sample
To test the robustness of our cross-sectional regressions, we run Fama-MacBeth (1973) cross-
sectional regressions on the full sample. We use the monthly excess returns from July of
year t to June of year t + 1 as the dependent variable. The independent variables include:
the cash holding proxies of CH and ECM , the dummy variable of the limits-to-arbitrage
proxies, the interaction term between a cash holding proxies and a dummy variable of limits-
to-arbitrage proxies, and the control variables. The dummy variable is equal to one if a firm’s
limits-to-arbitrage proxy of BA, PI, DV , IO, or IV OLFF3 is above the median, and zero
otherwise.
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The results are presented in Table X. The coefficients on cash holding proxies are positive
and statistically significant at the 1% level across both of the cash holding measures for all
limits-to-arbitrage proxies. Moreover, the interaction terms are significantly positive for BA,
PI (marginal significant), and IV OLFF3. The results suggest that firms with high BA, PI,
and IV OLFF3 have the stronger positive relationship between cash holding and returns than
firms with low BA, PI, and IV OLFF3. Moreover, the interaction terms are negative for DV
and IO. These indicate that low DV and IO firms have the stronger positive relationship
between cash holding and returns than high DV and IO firms. In summary, our results
confirm our previous findings that cash holding variables have the stronger explanatory power
on returns for stocks with high transaction costs, high short selling costs and large idiosyncratic
volatility than stocks with low costs and risk.
5 Conclusion
We examine the role of investor sentiment and limit-to-arbitrage in explaining the positive re-
lationship between cash holding and stock returns documented by Palazzo (2012) and Simutin
(2010). Our results show that firms with high cash holdings tend to be small and growth firms.
They have high cash flow risk and low percentage of institutional ownership. Consistent with
Baker and Wurgler (2006), we find that stock returns of cash holding portfolios are strongly
conditional on investor sentiment. In particular, the cash holding effect is significant only
when sentiment is low.
Using the two-way portfolio sorts approach and Fama-MacBeth (1973) cross-section re-
gression, we find that the cash holding effect is stronger for stocks with large transaction and
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short selling costs, and high idiosyncratic volatility than those with low costs and idiosyncratic
volatility. The results are robust to various measures of cash holding and transaction costs.
Overall, our findings support the investor sentiment and limits-to-arbitrage explanations for
the cash holding effect, whereby investor sentiment leads to market mispricing on firms with
high and low cash holdings. Large transaction and short selling costs, and high idiosyncratic
volatility prevent rational investors from exploiting the cash holding effect and eliminating
the mispricing.
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Table I: Descriptive statistics
This table reports the mean, standard deviation (SD), minimum (Min), median, maximum (Max) and correlation of the measures of cash holding, transaction costs,
short selling costs and idiosyncratic volatility. We use two cash holding measures: cash-to-asset ratio (CH) and excess cash measure (ECM); three transaction costs
measures: the quoted bid-ask spread (BA, %), price impact (PI, 106), and dollar volume (DV , $000); the short selling costs measure of the percentage of institutional
ownership (IO), and the idiosyncratic volatility measure of IV OLFF3. CH is calculated as cash and marketable securities (data item CHEQ) divided by total assets
(data item ATQ). ECM is estimated as the residual from the cross-sectional regression of the log of cash-to-assets ratios against determinate variables suggested by
Opler, et al. (1999). BA is estimated as the difference between the quoted ask price and bid price to the mid-quote on a day. PI is the price impact measure that
is defined as the daily absolute return-to-dollar-volume ratio. DV is calculated as the number of shares traded multiplied by the transaction price during a day. IO
is computed as the percentage of institutional ownership to shares outstanding. The idiosyncratic volatility measure is estimated as the standard deviations of the
regression residuals from the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model using daily stock returns over prior 12 months with a minimum of 100 days, respectively.
The mean, standard deviation and Spearman rank correlations are based on the time-series cross-sectional averages. The p-values are in the parentheses. The sample
includes all common stocks on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ with positive cash-to-assets ratios and positive book-to-market ratios for the period from July 1972
to June 2011. Financial firms (SIC codes 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC codes 4900-4999) are excluded from the sample.
CH ECM BA PI DV IO IV OLFF3
Descriptive statistics
Mean 0.170 0.001 0.061 9.121 8612.944 0.332 0.034
SD 0.216 1.467 0.091 206.756 62925.665 0.275 0.029
MIN 0.000 -11.770 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
MAX 1.442 11.698 1.908 99410.109 6155167.000 1.000 1.871
Correlation
ECM 0.530 1.000
(0.000)
BA -0.071 -0.084 1.000
(0.000) (0.000)
PI -0.026 -0.042 0.129 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
DV 0.031 0.023 -0.084 -0.006 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
IO -0.016 0.054 -0.418 -0.096 0.171 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
IV OLFF3 0.136 -0.068 0.387 0.114 -0.063 -0.319 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
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Table II: Equity returns across cash holding portfolios
This table reports the equal-weighted monthly average raw returns and abnormal returns for cash-to-assets (CH) and
excess cash measure (ECM) portfolios. At the end of each month of year t, we sort stocks into deciles based on
their CH and hold the portfolios for the subsequent month. The CH portfolios are rebalanced monthly. To form
ECM deciles, at the end of June of year t, we sort stocks based on their ECM measured by using accounting data
from year t-1. The ECM portfolios are held for the subsequent twelve months and rebalanced annually. CH1 and
ECM1 represent the portfolios that comprise stocks with the lowest CHs or ECMs. CH10 and ECM10 represent the
portfolios that contain stocks with the highest CHs or ECMs. ∆CH and ∆ECM represent the difference between the
top and the bottom cash holding deciles. The CAPM alpha is the intercept from the time-series regression of the excess
portfolio returns on the excess market returns. The FF3 alpha is the intercept from the time-series regression of the
excess portfolio returns on the excess market returns and the Fama and French (1993) three factors. The corresponding
t-statistics based on Newey and West (1987) standard errors with six lags are in parentheses. The sample period covers
from July 1972 to June 2011.
CH1 CH2 CH3 CH4 CH5 CH6 CH7 CH8 CH9 CH10 ∆CH
Panel A: CH cash holding measure
Raw return 0.938 1.032 1.048 1.140 1.275 1.327 1.400 1.448 1.494 1.505 0.567
(2.94) (3.17) (3.28) (3.46) (3.84) (3.94) (3.98) (3.94) (3.95) (3.55) (2.21)
CAPM alpha -0.009 0.064 0.076 0.165 0.280 0.326 0.376 0.403 0.472 0.426 0.435
(-0.05) (0.37) (0.46) (0.95) (1.66) (1.92) (2.04) (2.02) (1.94) (1.61) (1.74)
FF3 alpha -0.386 -0.292 -0.238 -0.167 -0.009 0.100 0.232 0.378 0.539 0.551 0.937
(-3.22) (-2.55) (-2.17) (-1.48) (-0.09) (0.96) (2.01) (2.83) (2.92) (3.16) (4.82)
ECM1 ECM2 ECM3 ECM4 ECM5 ECM6 ECM7 ECM8 ECM9 ECM10 ∆ECM
Panel B: ECM cash holding measure
Raw return 1.083 1.256 1.250 1.277 1.292 1.408 1.402 1.451 1.445 1.505 0.422
(3.28) (3.90) (3.88) (3.97) (3.99) (4.30) (4.27) (4.36) (4.19) (4.37) (2.82)
CAPM alpha 0.137 0.295 0.275 0.298 0.311 0.413 0.407 0.444 0.428 0.536 0.399
(0.70) (1.72) (1.68) (1.85) (1.96) (2.52) (2.55) (2.67) (2.41) (2.34) (2.26)
FF3 alpha -0.169 0.015 -0.019 0.028 0.014 0.168 0.201 0.258 0.286 0.443 0.613
(-1.34) (0.14) (-0.19) (0.27) (0.16) (1.68) (2.15) (2.65) (2.87) (2.40) (3.43)
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Table III: Characteristics of cash holding portfolios
This table reports means of firm characteristics, the transaction costs, short selling costs and idiosyncratic volatility measures for cash-to-assets (CH) portfolios. At
the end of each month of year t, we sort stocks into deciles based on their CH and hold the portfolios for the subsequent month. The CH portfolios are rebalanced
monthly. CH1 represents a portfolio that comprises stocks with the lowest CHs. CH10 represents a portfolio that contains stocks with the highest CHs. ∆CH
represent the difference between CH10 and CH1. The corresponding t-statistics based on Newey and West (1987) standard errors with six lags are in parentheses.
The variables of firm characteristics in Panel A are excess cash measure (ECM), market capitalization of equity (MV , in millions dollar), book-to-market ratio
(B/M), cash flow risk (CFR), return on assets ratio (Profit), long-term and short-term debts to assets ratio (Leverage), net investment(NetInv), dividend payout
dummy(DivDummy), research & development to sales ratio (R&D) and acquisitions to assets ratio (Acquisition). The detailed definitions of firm characteristics are
reported in Appendix. We estimate three transaction costs measures: the quoted bid-ask spread (BA, %), price impact (PI, 106), and dollar volume (DV , $000); the
short selling costs measure of the percentage of institutional ownership (IO) in Panel B, and the idiosyncratic volatility measure of IV OLFF3 in Panel C. IV OLFF3
is estimated as the standard deviations of the regression residuals from the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model using daily stock returns over prior 12 months
with a minimum of 100 days, respectively. The reported means are time-series average of the cross-sectional values.
CH1 CH2 CH3 CH4 CH5 CH6 CH7 CH8 CH9 CH10 ∆CH
Panel A: Firm characteristics
ECM -1.549 -0.897 -0.554 -0.250 0.005 0.262 0.507 0.755 1.066 1.655 3.204 (61.96)
MV ($m) 861.668 1309.390 1578.903 1535.388 1453.640 1527.137 1220.064 997.591 834.727 377.505 -484.163 (-10.08)
B/M 1.208 1.148 1.110 1.081 1.026 0.964 0.887 0.827 0.721 0.680 -0.528 (-14.19)
CFR 0.059 0.050 0.053 0.060 0.069 0.074 0.088 0.087 0.109 0.178 0.119 (17.10)
Profit 0.089 0.107 0.113 0.109 0.103 0.097 0.093 0.078 0.039 -0.119 -0.208 (-14.29)
Leverage 0.331 0.321 0.308 0.291 0.267 0.236 0.199 0.157 0.125 0.095 -0.236 (-64.11)
NetInv 83.372 98.904 109.183 101.799 98.150 79.939 51.096 35.552 21.799 7.500 -75.872 (-13.44)
DivDummy 0.402 0.465 0.471 0.457 0.443 0.423 0.397 0.367 0.323 0.255 -0.147 (-12.53)
R&D 0.064 0.068 0.035 0.066 1.360 0.948 0.284 1.181 1.738 8.730 8.665 (9.80)
Acquisition 0.024 0.025 0.025 0.023 0.021 0.019 0.016 0.014 0.011 0.004 -0.019 (-17.70)
Panel B: Transaction costs and short selling costs
BA 0.066 0.054 0.053 0.053 0.053 0.053 0.050 0.048 0.047 0.054 -0.013 (-12.68)
PI 13.304 8.771 8.384 8.622 8.454 7.668 7.367 6.441 5.070 6.082 -7.222 (-12.46)
DV 5078.363 7409.701 8576.759 8977.237 8563.700 10121.852 9862.557 10659.921 10691.009 4665.116 -413.247 (-1.04)
IO 0.335 0.373 0.376 0.371 0.362 0.365 0.362 0.354 0.333 0.283 -0.052 (-16.25)
Panel C: Idiosyncratic volatility
IV OLFF3 0.037 0.034 0.034 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.036 0.037 0.042 0.004 (7.90)
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Table IV: Portfolio abnormal returns conditional on investor sentiment across cash holding portfolios
At the end of each month of year t, we sort stocks into CH deciles based on their cash-to-assets ratios. The portfolios are held for the subsequent month
and rebalanced monthly. To form ECM portfolios, at the end of June of year t, we sort stocks into deciles based on stocks’ excess cash measured by
using accounting data from year t-1. The portfolios are held for the subsequent twelve months and rebalanced annually. CH1 and ECM1 represent the
portfolios that comprise stocks with the lowest CHs or ECMs. CH10 and ECM10 represent the portfolios that contain stocks with the highest CHs or
ECMs. ∆CH and ∆ECM are the difference between the top and bottom cash holding deciles. We then report the equal-weighted average abnormal
returns from the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model (FF3 alphas) over the months in which sentiment in the previous month is above or below
the median for the Baker and Wurgler (2006) investor sentiment index, and the University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index, and the return
difference between two averages. The sample period covers from July 1972 to June 2011, except for the Baker and Wurgler (2006) investor sentiment
index which ends in December 2010.
Panel A: CH cash holding measure
CH1 CH2 CH3 CH4 CH5 CH6 CH7 CH8 CH9 CH10 ∆CH
Investor sentiment of Baker and Wurgler (2006)
Above the median -0.233 -0.071 -0.001 0.084 0.108 0.127 0.306 0.222 0.308 0.136 0.370
(-0.49) (-0.15) (-0.00) (0.17) (0.22) (0.25) (0.56) (0.37) (0.50) (0.20) (0.88)
Below the median -0.062 -0.050 -0.041 0.001 0.238 0.423 0.436 0.730 0.804 1.072 1.133
(-0.38) (-0.33) (-0.31) (0.01) (1.59) (3.16) (2.97) (4.14) (4.08) (4.29) (4.44)
Difference -0.171 -0.021 0.040 0.084 -0.129 -0.296 -0.130 -0.508 -0.496 -0.935 -0.764
(-0.34) (-0.04) (0.08) (0.17) (-0.25) (-0.57) (-0.23) (-0.84) (-0.80) (-1.26) (-1.48)
University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index
Above the median -0.014 0.058 0.159 0.237 0.294 0.238 0.338 0.301 0.403 0.319 0.334
(-0.04) (0.16) (0.42) (0.61) (0.74) (0.56) (0.71) (0.56) (0.72) (0.48) (0.72)
Below the median -0.255 -0.145 -0.162 -0.132 0.116 0.283 0.369 0.623 0.627 0.713 0.968
(-1.56) (-0.91) (-1.15) (-0.85) (0.77) (2.02) (2.56) (3.55) (3.41) (3.00) (4.05)
Difference 0.241 0.203 0.321 0.368 0.178 -0.045 -0.032 -0.322 -0.224 -0.394 -0.635
(0.58) (0.50) (0.79) (0.88) (0.41) (-0.10) (-0.06) (-0.57) (-0.39) (-0.58) (-1.39)
Panel B: ECM cash holding measure
ECM1 ECM2 ECM3 ECM4 ECM5 ECM6 ECM7 ECM8 ECM9 ECM10 ∆ECM
Investor sentiment of Baker and Wurgler (2006)
Above the median -0.111 0.179 0.166 0.205 0.117 0.378 0.370 0.306 0.360 0.386 0.496
(-0.23) (0.37) (0.35) (0.43) (0.25) (0.76) (0.74) (0.61) (0.67) (0.74) (2.00)
Below the median 0.126 0.244 0.208 0.231 0.296 0.298 0.379 0.505 0.530 0.615 0.489
(0.78) (1.73) (1.52) (1.68) (2.51) (2.29) (2.91) (3.57) (3.74) (4.02) (3.49)
Difference -0.237 -0.065 -0.042 -0.026 -0.179 0.080 -0.009 -0.199 -0.170 -0.229 0.007
(-0.47) (-0.13) (-0.08) (-0.05) (-0.36) (0.16) (-0.02) (-0.39) (-0.31) (-0.44) (0.03)
University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index
Above the median 0.043 0.316 0.363 0.339 0.281 0.426 0.461 0.502 0.498 0.486 0.443
(0.11) (0.81) (0.93) (0.86) (0.73) (1.03) (1.12) (1.17) (1.07) (1.05) (1.62)
Below the median -0.039 0.096 0.005 0.115 0.181 0.265 0.272 0.328 0.332 0.447 0.485
(-0.23) (0.66) (0.04) (0.84) (1.42) (2.09) (2.04) (2.30) (2.35) (3.16) (3.23)
Difference 0.082 0.220 0.358 0.224 0.100 0.161 0.189 0.175 0.166 0.039 -0.043
(0.19) (0.53) (0.85) (0.53) (0.24) (0.37) (0.44) (0.39) (0.34) (0.08) (-0.15)
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Table V: Regressions of high-minus-low cash portfolios on investor sentiment
At the end of each month of year t, we sort stocks into CH deciles based on their cash-to-assets ratios. The portfolios are held for the subsequent month
and rebalanced monthly. To form ECM portfolios, at the end of June of year t, we sort stocks into deciles based on stocks’ excess cash measured by
using accounting data from year t-1. The portfolios are held for the subsequent twelve months and rebalanced annually. The dependent variable is the
equal-weighted returns of hedge portfolio that is long the top three CHs or ECMs deciles and shorts the bottom three CHs or ECMs deciles. The
independent variables are the one-month lagged returns of maximum correlation portfolio (MCP) of investor sentiment and the Fama and French (1993)
three factors. We run regression of the demeaned sentiment index on monthly excess returns of the 2 × 3 equal-weighted MV &B/M -sorted portfolios
to obtain the portfolio weights and use the weight to construct the maximum correlation portfolio of sentiment. We use the Baker and Wurgler (2006)
investor sentiment index and the University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index to proxy for sentiment. The corresponding t-statistics based on
Newey and West (1987) standard errors with six lags are in parentheses. The sample period covers from July 1972 to June 2011, except for the Baker
and Wurgler (2006) investor sentiment index which ends in December 2010.
Panel A: CHHigh − CHLow Panel B: ECMHigh − ECMLow
Investor sentiment of University of Michigan Investor sentiment of University of Michigan
Baker and Wurgler (2006) Consumer Sentiment Index Baker and Wurgler (2006) Consumer Sentiment Index
Constant 0.007 0.011 0.009 0.011 0.003 0.005 0.004 0.005
(3.48) (6.39) (4.63) (6.50) (3.23) (4.16) (4.03) (4.39)
SentimentMCP -0.866 -0.743 -0.032 -0.021 -0.002 -0.002 -1.073 -0.578
(-4.46) (-6.50) (-6.53) (-6.84) (-2.42) (-1.76) (-4.25) (-2.35)
Rm,t −Rf,t -0.088 -0.074 -0.013 -0.012
(-1.84) (-1.59) (-0.32) (-0.31)
SMB 0.072 0.073 0.050 0.040
(0.79) (0.76) (0.88) (0.69)
HML -0.850 -0.734 -0.315 -0.285
(-10.71) (-9.58) (-8.19) (-7.61)
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Table VI: Two-way portfolio sorts on cash holding and transaction costs or short selling costs
At the end of each month of year t, we sort stocks into quintiles based on their cash-to-assets (CH) and sort stocks independently into terciles based
on their transaction costs and short selling costs proxies. The portfolios are held for the subsequent month and rebalanced monthly. To form excess
cash measure(ECM)-based portfolios, at the end of June of each year t, we sort stocks into quintiles based on stocks’ excess cash measured by using
accounting data from year t-1, and sort stocks independently into terciles based on their transaction costs and short selling costs proxies. The portfolios
are held for the subsequent twelve months and rebalanced annually. We use three transaction costs measures of the quoted bid-ask spread (BA, %),
price impact (PI, 106), and dollar volume (DV , $000); and the short selling costs measure of the percentage of institutional ownership (IO). We then
report the equal-weighted monthly average abnormal returns from the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model (FF3 alphas). CH1 and ECM1 are
the bottom cash holding quintiles. CH3 and ECM3 are the third cash holding quintiles. CH5 and ECM5 are the top cash holding quintiles. ∆CH
and ∆ECM are the difference between the top and bottom cash holding quintiles. BA1, PI1, DV1 and IO1 are the bottom terciles. BA2, PI2, DV2
and IO2 are the middle terciles. BA3, PI3, DV3 and IO3 are the top terciles. ∆BA, ∆PI, ∆DV and ∆IO are the difference between the top and the
bottom terciles. The corresponding t-statistics based on Newey and West (1987) standard errors with six lags are in parentheses. The sample period
covers from July 1972 to June 2011.
Panel A: CH cash holding measure Panel B: ECM cash holding measure
CH1 CH3 CH5 ∆CH ECM1 ECM3 ECM5 ∆ECM
BA as a measure of transaction costs
BA1 0.221 0.352 0.873 0.651 0.292 0.485 0.517 0.224
(2.11) (3.29) (6.27) (3.49) (3.06) (5.21) (4.79) (1.90)
BA2 -0.176 0.336 0.898 1.074 0.121 0.368 0.716 0.595
(-1.33) (2.58) (4.78) (4.78) (1.04) (3.39) (6.38) (5.52)
BA3 0.567 1.118 2.194 1.628 0.658 0.863 1.560 0.902
(2.35) (4.11) (5.82) (4.69) (3.20) (4.70) (4.06) (2.59)
∆BA 0.345 0.767 1.322 0.366 0.378 1.043
(1.46) (2.77) (3.52) (1.78) (2.02) (2.71)
PI as a measure of transaction costs
PI1 0.169 0.309 0.864 0.695 0.225 0.418 0.445 0.220
(1.50) (3.47) (5.23) (3.41) (2.46) (4.71) (4.06) (1.89)
PI2 -0.221 0.242 0.851 1.073 0.103 0.390 0.628 0.525
(-1.95) (2.14) (4.79) (5.17) (0.89) (3.57) (5.56) (4.55)
PI3 0.373 0.902 1.826 1.452 0.582 0.818 1.354 0.771
(2.02) (4.91) (5.45) (4.87) (3.06) (5.05) (4.39) (2.85)
∆PI 0.205 0.593 0.962 0.357 0.400 0.909
(1.04) (3.02) (2.84) (1.77) (2.28) (2.88)
DV as a measure of transaction costs
DV1 0.434 0.950 1.846 1.413 0.656 0.927 1.351 0.695
(2.42) (5.52) (5.64) (4.69) (3.67) (5.93) (4.50) (2.57)
DV2 -0.254 0.212 0.866 1.121 0.081 0.304 0.643 0.562
(-2.26) (1.73) (4.57) (5.44) (0.69) (3.06) (5.49) (5.01)
DV3 0.135 0.290 0.914 0.779 0.158 0.399 0.427 0.269
(1.13) (3.02) (4.55) (3.34) (1.64) (4.31) (3.57) (2.19)
∆DV 0.299 0.660 0.932 0.498 0.528 0.924
(1.58) (3.45) (2.65) (2.59) (3.10) (3.00)
IO as a measure of short selling costs
IO1 -0.033 0.374 1.336 1.370 0.207 0.436 1.266 1.059
(-0.16) (1.76) (3.12) (3.25) (0.96) (2.36) (2.48) (2.11)
IO2 0.037 0.514 0.886 0.849 0.381 0.522 0.744 0.364
(0.28) (4.67) (6.31) (4.29) (3.10) (4.62) (6.26) (3.17)
IO3 0.078 0.488 0.858 0.779 0.349 0.522 0.549 0.200
(0.62) (5.00) (5.91) (3.71) (3.04) (5.30) (4.68) (1.46)
∆IO 0.112 0.114 -0.479 0.142 0.086 -0.717
(0.55) (0.52) (-1.15) (0.63) (0.42) (-1.42)
35
Table VII: Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions for transaction costs and short selling costs subgroups
For each month from July of year t to June of year t+ 1, we estimate the average coefficients from Fama and MacBeth cross-sectional regressions of the
monthly percent excess returns on the cash holding variables plus the control variables for the Low, High, and High-Low transaction costs or short selling
costs subgroups. The cash holding variables are cash-to-assets ratio (CH) and excess cash measure (ECM). The control variables are size (ln(MV )),
book-to-market (ln(B/M)), and momentum (MOM). ln(MV ) is the natural logarithm of market capitalization calculated with information available
at the end of June of year t. ln(B/M) is the natural logarithm of the ratio of the book value of equity for the fiscal year ending in year t− 1 divided by
market equity at the end of December of year t − 1. MOM is the cumulative compounded stock returns of the previous 6 months from June of year t
to May of year t + 1. We use three transaction costs measures of the quoted bid-ask spread (BA, %), price impact (PI, 106), and dollar volume (DV ,
$000); and the short selling costs measure of the percentage of institutional ownership (IO). At the end of each month of year t, we sort stocks into
three terciles based on their BA, PI, DV , and IO. Low represents the bottom subgroup. High represents the top subgroup and High-Low represents
the difference between the top and the bottom subgroups. The corresponding t-statistics based on Newey and West (1987) standard errors with six lags
are in parentheses. The sample period covers from July 1972 to June 2011.
Constant CH ln(MV ) ln(B/M) MOM Constant ECM ln(MV ) ln(B/M) MOM
Panel A: CH cash holding measure Panel B: ECM cash holding measure
BA as a measure of transaction costs
Low 0.711 1.473 0.019 0.399 0.384 0.854 0.045 0.024 0.378 0.410
(1.47) (3.98) (0.32) (4.80) (1.95) (1.72) (1.71) (0.46) (4.45) (1.89)
High 2.522 5.553 -0.556 0.254 0.275 2.782 0.163 -0.608 0.310 0.096
(4.75) (3.54) (-4.21) (2.04) (0.61) (5.85) (3.49) (-6.85) (4.16) (0.64)
High-Low 1.811 4.080 -0.575 -0.145 -0.109 1.928 0.118 -0.632 -0.067 -0.314
(4.17) (2.65) (-4.33) (-1.20) (-0.23) (5.23) (2.36) (-7.13) (-0.84) (-1.60)
PI as a measure of transaction costs
Low 0.623 1.810 0.017 0.396 0.426 0.797 0.064 0.009 0.327 0.562
(1.12) (4.56) (0.30) (5.47) (2.02) (1.36) (2.20) (0.17) (4.11) (2.56)
High 2.409 2.136 -0.484 0.278 0.132 2.636 0.156 -0.485 0.226 0.116
(4.71) (5.11) (-5.00) (3.59) (0.71) (5.10) (3.97) (-5.02) (2.99) (0.76)
High-Low 1.786 0.327 -0.501 -0.118 -0.294 1.839 0.092 -0.494 -0.102 -0.445
(3.74) (0.74) (-4.89) (-1.50) (-1.26) (4.05) (2.10) (-5.11) (-1.29) (-2.11)
DV as a measure of transaction costs
Low 2.394 1.983 -0.478 0.267 0.011 2.528 0.151 -0.438 0.219 0.174
(4.72) (4.99) (-4.99) (3.60) (0.06) (4.85) (3.84) (-4.37) (3.04) (1.03)
High 0.342 2.049 0.061 0.411 0.255 0.542 0.077 0.049 0.345 0.318
(0.53) (4.93) (0.96) (5.44) (1.34) (0.82) (2.61) (0.78) (4.35) (1.65)
High-Low -2.052 0.066 0.539 0.145 0.244 -1.986 -0.074 0.487 0.126 0.144
(-4.22) (0.15) (5.57) (1.79) (1.15) (-4.17) (-1.64) (5.15) (1.61) (0.71)
IO as a measure of short selling costs
Low 1.712 2.566 -0.260 0.527 -0.177 1.974 0.193 -0.260 0.482 0.124
(3.41) (5.49) (-3.04) (6.03) (-1.28) (3.80) (3.15) (-2.87) (5.53) (0.90)
High 0.638 1.386 0.027 0.212 0.323 1.095 0.041 -0.024 0.112 0.327
(1.22) (3.24) (0.62) (2.83) (1.80) (2.08) (1.30) (-0.52) (1.33) (1.56)
High-Low -1.073 -1.180 0.287 -0.314 0.500 -0.879 -0.153 0.236 -0.370 0.203
(-2.52) (-2.68) (3.35) (-3.89) (2.80) (-1.93) (-2.43) (2.57) (-4.40) (1.06)
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Table VIII: Two-way portfolio sorts on cash holding and idiosyncratic risk
At the end of each month of year t, we sort stocks into quintiles based on their cash-to-assets ratio (CH) and sort stocks
independently into terciles based on their idiosyncratic volatility measures, and hold the portfolios for the subsequent
month. The CH portfolios are rebalanced monthly. To form excess cash measure (ECM)-based portfolios, at the end
of June of each year t, we sort stocks into quintile based on their ECM and sort stocks independently into terciles based
on their idiosyncratic volatility measure, and hold the portfolios for the subsequent twelve months. The ECM portfolios
are rebalanced annually. The idiosyncratic volatility measure (IV OLFF3) is estimated as the standard deviations of
the regression residuals from the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model using daily stock returns over prior 12
months with a minimum of 100 days. We then report the equal-weighted monthly average abnormal returns from the
Fama and French (1993) three-factor model (FF3 alphas). CH1 and ECM1 are the bottom cash holding quintile. CH3
and ECM3 are the third cash holding quintile CH5 and ECM5 are the top cash holding quintile. ∆CH and ∆ECM
are the difference between the top and bottom cash holding quintiles. IV OL1 is the bottom idiosyncratic volatility
tercile. IV OL2 is the middle idiosyncratic volatility tercile. IV OL3 is the top idiosyncratic volatility tercile. ∆IV OL
is the difference between the top and the bottom idiosyncratic volatility terciles. The corresponding t-statistics based
on Newey and West (1987) standard errors with six lags are in parentheses. The sample period covers from July 1972
to June 2011.
Panel A: CH cash holding measure Panel B: ECM cash holding measure
CH1 CH3 CH5 ∆CH ECM1 ECM3 ECM5 ∆ECM
IV OL1 0.393 0.613 0.849 0.456 0.460 0.639 0.637 0.177
(4.35) (7.39) (10.46) (4.16) (5.65) (7.81) (8.26) (2.88)
IV OL2 0.068 0.523 0.915 0.847 0.298 0.440 0.669 0.370
(0.53) (5.32) (7.63) (4.86) (2.62) (4.74) (7.00) (3.28)
IV OL3 -0.119 0.342 1.285 1.404 0.374 0.554 1.211 0.837
(-0.52) (1.48) (4.52) (5.77) (1.69) (2.56) (3.49) (2.90)
∆IV OL -0.512 -0.270 0.435 -0.086 -0.085 0.575
(-2.13) (-1.08) (1.49) (-0.37) (-0.36) (1.55)
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Table IX: Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions for idiosyncratic volatility subgroups
For each month from July of year t to June of year t+ 1, we estimate the average coefficients from Fama and MacBeth cross-sectional regressions of the
monthly percent excess returns on the cash holding variables plus the control variables for the Low, High, and High-Low idiosyncratic volatility subgroups.
The cash holding variables are cash-to-assets ratio (CH) and excess cash measure (ECM). The control variables are size (ln(MV )), book-to-market
(ln(B/M)), and momentum (MOM). ln(MV ) is the natural logarithm of market capitalization calculated with information available at the end of June
of year t. ln(B/M) is the natural logarithm of the ratio of the book value of equity for the fiscal year ending in year t− 1 divided by market equity at
the end of December of year t− 1. MOM is the cumulative compounded stock returns of the previous 6 months from June of year t to May of year t+ 1.
The idiosyncratic volatility measures (IV OLFF3) is estimated as the standard deviations of the regression residuals from the Fama and French (1993)
three-factor model over prior 12 months with a minimum of 100 days. At the end of each month of year t, we sort stocks into three terciles based on
their IV OLFF3. Low represents the bottom idiosyncratic volatility subgroup. High represents the top idiosyncratic volatility subgroup and High-Low
represents the difference between the top and the bottom idiosyncratic volatility subgroups. The corresponding t-statistics based on Newey and West
(1987) standard errors with six lags are in parentheses. The sample period covers from July 1972 to June 2011.
Constant CH ln(MV ) ln(B/M) MOM Constant ECM ln(MV ) ln(B/M) MOM
Low 0.813 0.848 -0.023 0.189 0.746 0.865 0.043 -0.014 0.151 0.632
(2.66) (3.10) (-0.75) (3.16) (3.58) (3.09) (2.71) (-0.50) (2.65) (3.81)
High 2.578 3.043 -0.617 0.385 0.154 2.878 0.203 -0.589 0.395 0.117
(5.09) (7.03) (-6.86) (4.93) (0.95) (6.19) (5.42) (-7.32) (5.57) (0.89)
High-Low 1.765 2.196 -0.594 0.196 -0.591 2.012 0.160 -0.575 0.244 -0.515
(4.53) (5.28) (-6.99) (2.50) (-2.83) (5.95) (4.46) (-7.86) (4.10) (-3.50)
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Table X: Fama-MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions for the full sample
This table reports the average slopes for monthly excess returns from Fama and MacBeth cross-sectional regressions.
Panels A and B report the results based on the cash holding proxies of cash-to-assets ratio (CH) and excess cash
measure (ECM), respectively. The independent variables are: the cash holding proxies, the dummy variable of the
limit-to-arbitrage proxies, the interaction term between a cash holding proxy and a dummy variable of limits-to-
arbitrage proxies, and the control variables of size (ln(MV )), book-to-market (ln(B/M)) and momentum (MOM).
ln(MV ) is the natural logarithm of market capitalization calculated with information available at the end of June of
year t, ln(B/M) is the natural logarithm of the ratio of the book value of equity for the fiscal year ending in year
t − 1 divided by market equity at the end of December of year t − 1, and MOMi,t is the cumulative compounded
stock returns of the previous 6 months from June of year t to May of year t+ 1. We use five limit-to-arbitrage proxies
of the quoted bid-ask spread (BA, %), price impact (PI, 106), dollar volume (DV , $000), percentage of institutional
ownership (IO), and idiosyncratic risk based on FF3 (IV OLFF3). The dummy variable is equal to one for a firm with
the limit-to-arbitrage proxies above the median and zero otherwise. The corresponding t-statistics based on Newey
and West (1987) standard errors with six lags are in parentheses. The sample period covers from July 1972 to June
2011.
Constant Cash holding Limit-to-arbitrage Interaction ln(MV ) ln(B/M) MOM
Panel A: CH cash holding measure
BA 1.576 1.532 -0.069 0.959 -0.147 0.395 0.153
(3.68) (4.37) (-0.62) (2.35) (-2.85) (5.52) (1.02)
PI 1.177 1.740 0.019 0.660 -0.059 0.428 0.135
(2.48) (4.65) (0.19) (1.87) (-1.19) (6.34) (0.91)
DV 1.198 2.257 -0.073 -0.379 -0.052 0.429 0.152
(2.51) (5.87) (-0.59) (-1.10) (-0.91) (6.56) (1.02)
IO 1.057 2.199 0.176 -0.590 -0.043 0.429 0.044
(2.22) (5.24) (1.78) (-1.73) (-0.93) (6.03) (0.34)
IV OLFF3 1.586 1.217 -0.334 1.282 -0.126 0.381 0.129
(4.93) (4.16) (-1.69) (3.97) (-3.25) (6.35) (0.94)
Panel B: ECM cash holding measure
BA 1.737 0.073 -0.057 0.078 -0.151 0.378 0.130
(3.84) (2.83) (-0.66) (2.13) (-2.93) (5.34) (0.98)
PI 1.483 0.074 0.026 0.053 -0.090 0.356 0.150
(2.89) (2.87) (0.27) (1.62) (-1.72) (4.98) (1.05)
DV 1.464 0.124 -0.120 -0.048 -0.072 0.350 0.163
(3.00) (4.14) (-0.92) (-1.45) (-1.21) (5.06) (1.15)
IO 1.375 0.150 0.171 -0.084 -0.073 0.352 0.160
(2.84) (3.41) (1.90) (-1.94) (-1.49) (4.56) (1.22)
IV OLFF3 1.523 0.069 -0.045 0.069 -0.104 0.363 0.144
(4.81) (3.77) (-0.26) (2.27) (-2.85) (5.79) (1.10)
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APPENDIX A: Firm characteristics
CH: cash-to-assets ratio, the ratio of cash and marketable securities (data item CHEQ) to
the book value of total assets (data item ATQ).
MV : market capitalization of equity, calculated by share price at the end of June in year
t times the number of shares outstanding from the CRSP.
B/M : book-to-market equity, the ratio of the book value of equity to the market value of
equity. Following Davis et al. (2000), the book value of equity is calculated as the shareholders’
equity (data item SEQ), plus balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credits (data
item TXDITC) (if available), less the book value of preferred stock (in the following order:
data item PSTKRV or data item PSTKL or data item PSTK) from the Compustat. The
B/M ratio of year t is the book value of equity for the fiscal year ending in year t− 1, divided
by market value at the end of December in year t− 1 from the CRSP.
MOM : momentum, computed as the cumulative compounded stock returns of the previ-
ous 6 months from June of year t to May of year t+ 1.
CFR: cash flow risk, calculated as the standard deviation of a ratio of operating income
before depreciation (data item OIBDP ) less the sum of interest expenses (data item XINT ),
income taxes (data item TXT ), dividends of preferred shares (data item DV P ), and dividends
of common shares (data item DV C) to the book value of total assets over 10 years.
Profit: profitability, computed as the ratio of the operating income before depreciation
(data item OIBDP ) to the book value of total assets.
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Leverage: leverage, the ratio of sum of long-term debt (data item DLTT ) and debt in
current liabilities (data item DLC) to the book value of total assets.
NetInv: net investment, the ratio of net investment to total assets. Net investment is
calculated as the sum of capital expenditures (data item CAPX) plus acquisitions (data item
SCSTKC) net of sales of property (data item SPPE).
DivDummy: dividend payout dummy, a dummy variable equals one in years in which a
firm pays a common dividend (data item DV C). Otherwise, the dummy equals zero.
R&D: research & development to sales ratio, calculated as the ratio of research & devel-
opment expense (data item XRD) to sales (data item SALE).
Acquisition: acquisitions to assets ratio, calculated as the ratio of acquisitions (data item
AQC) to the book value of total assets.
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